Introduction
The notion that public works programs can build a strong social safety net through redistribution of wealth and generation of meaningful employment has gained ground in recent years. Many countries are increasingly adopting this strategy to tackle growing unemployment and poverty. 1 The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA)
is a similar endeavor in India. 2 NREGA was enacted during a time when more than a decade of sustained high growth in GDP experienced in the 1980s and the 1990s was perceived not to have made a sufficient dent in poverty in the rural India, leading to euphemism of co-existence of two India(s): one, a thriving urban India and the other, a stagnant rural India.
NREGA is a result of the Government of India's stated principles of 'inclusive growth'
and the desire to ensure that economic growth trickles down to the rural areas. When NREGA was enacted in August 2005, there was optimism that the initiative would transform rural India. 3 NREGA entitles every rural household in India to a minimum of 100 days of paid work per year. This is an unrestricted entitlement with no eligibility requirements. However, it was assumed that the nature of work under NREGA and the wage rate would ensure that the program is self-targeted that attracts only the poor.
The primary objective of NREGA is to augment wage employment. Its secondary objective is to strengthen natural resource management through works that address causes of chronic poverty like drought, deforestation and soil erosion and so encourage sustainable . We exploit this phase wise expansion of NREGA to evaluate the causal impacts ("Intent-to-Treat") of NREGA on various outcomes of interest such as participation in public work, labor force participation, and real wages of casual workers using the difference-in-difference (DID) methodology. 4 ' 5 Using two rounds of pre-program data, we also demonstrate that our main conclusions based on the DID estimates are not confounded by the pre-program differential trends between NREGA and non-NREGA districts.
The major findings of the paper are as follows. First, there has been a significant increase in the public works participation in NREGA districts compared to the non-NREGA districts. The increase in the share of public works in total casual labor has been much higher for the female workers compared with the male workers or Scheduled Caste/Tribe (SC/ST) workers. Second, NREGA has a positive impact on labor force participation, and this impact is driven by a significant impact on the female labor force participation. Post 2004-05, there has been a downward trend in labor force participation in rural India. However, the positive impact of NREGA mitigated the situation in NREGA districts compared to the non-NREGA districts. Third, NREGA has a positive impact on average wages of casual workers; however, we find that this positive impact is driven primarily by an increase in wages of female casual workers. The wages for female casual 4 These outcomes are affected easily given any demand and supply shock. We would have liked to look at the impacts of NREGA on the poverty and inequality; however, we could not implement our strategy for these outcomes because of lack of comparable post program data (discussed in detail in Section 2). Similarly, we do not expect that NREGA will have a considerable impact on assets that raises land productivity within couple of years, as these outcomes take time to materialize. 5 Casual labor is defined as a person who has been casually engaged in others' farm or non-farm enterprises (both household and non-household) and, in return, received wages according to the terms of the daily or periodic work contract. Casual workers are basically daily wage workers and the main target group of NREGA. 2 workers increased 8 percent more in NREGA districts compared to the non-NREGA districts. The impact of NREGA on male casual wages has been marginal (less than 1 percent increase). This suggests that the prevailing gender gaps in wages are reduced as a result of NREGA.
The issue of NREGA pushing up the cost of agriculture is passionately debated in Indian media. The argument forwarded against NREGA is that NREGA pushes up the average wage of casual workers and distorts the agriculture labor markets. 6 Our results suggest that NREGA has only increased the wages of female casual worker. The existing evidences suggest that female workers are paid much less than the statutory minimum wages and wages paid to their male counterparts. Thus NREGA helped in reducing the prevalent gender wage gap in casual works. One should see the increase in female wages as success for NREGA as one of the objectives of such a program is to improve the conditions and the bargaining power of the disadvantaged workers.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1.1, we review the key facts and the existing literature on NREGA. In Section 2, we describe the data, and we discuss the empirical strategy in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.
Background and Literature
NREGA is intended to give a legal guarantee of employment to anyone who is willing to do casual manual labor at the statutory minimum wage (about 2 USD per day). 7 Any adult who applies for work under NREGA is entitled to employment in public works within 15 days; otherwise, it is a state responsibility to provide them unemployment benefit.
However, this entitlement is subject to some important limitations. For instance, the 6 The upward pressure on wages can potentially come through two channels. First, NREGA increases the demand for casual labor for public works, and thus in turn increases the competition for casual labor. Second, by providing minimum statutory wages to NREGA workers, it increases the pressure on agriculture sector to pay the minimum wages. 7 The statutory minimum wages vary across states (see appendix Table A1 ).
3 work guarantee applies in rural areas only, and it is limited to "100 days per household per year." NREGA is based on the principle of self-selection, and it is a step towards legal enforcement of the right to work, as an aspect of the fundamental right to live with dignity. NREGA also mandates 33 percent participation for women.
To obtain work on a project, interested adult members of a rural household must first apply for a job card at the local Gram Panchayat (GP is lowest level of administration in the Indian government, comprising of a group of villages). Thus considerable amount of literature exists on NREGA; however, there is no study, to our knowledge, which looks at the impact of NREGA on the labor market outcomes.
The existing studies (for example, Khera and Nayak (2009) Besides their samples being restricted to one and five districts in the state of Andhra Pradesh, respectively, they only concentrate on consumption outcomes (not on the labor market outcomes).
Our paper contributes by estimating the causal impacts of NREGA on the labor market outcomes using nationally representative data. Our data contain all districts from eighteen major states in India. Most importantly, we give an estimate for the impact of NREGA on the prevailing wages of the casual workers, a much debated issue nowadays. As our identification strategy relies on NREGA being offered in treatment districts compared with NREGA being not offered in control districts, our DID estimates measure the difference in outcomes between the treatment and control districts known as "Intent-to-Treat" (ITT) effect. ITT is an average of the causal effects for those who actually participated in NREGA and those who do not (in NREGA districts). Thus,
ITT is the average impact of being offered the opportunity to participate in NREGA (via implementation of NREGA in the district). Although, TOT is interesting parameter, ITT parameter is certainly more important for policy maker who is designing similar policy for a similar population as it reflects the take up rates by individuals (since the policy maker has little influence on participation). Our paper is an important contribution to the literature on employment schemes and public works because NREGA as the world's largest program of this kind can provide important lessons to other developing countries that might embark on a similar safety net strategy.
Data
The analysis in this paper draws on individual level data from the Employment and Unem- NSS classifies workers into three groups: self-employed, regular salaried and casual workers. Casual workers are daily wage workers and NREGA is targeted towards them.
Our main variables of interest are labor market outcomes such as the share of public works in total casual workforce, and real wages of casual workers. We also look into how NREGA has affected the labor force participation decision. 12 We also use the Employment and Unemployment round for year 1999-00 to test for existing differential trends between NREGA and non-NREGA districts when there was no NREGA in any of the districts.
The information about phase wise expansion of NREGA in different districts comes from NREGA program webpage (http://nrega.nic.in). Nominal wages are adjusted using state specific consumer price indexes for agriculture laborers, and weekly wages are divided by number of days worked to get daily wages. 13 We also restrict our attention to people in age group 18-60. Details about variable construction, matching of districts across surveys are given in the data appendix. outcomes. 13 NSS does not collect information on hours of work but report time intensity of work for each day in the reference week assigning 1 day for 4 or more hours of work during a day and 0.5 day for 1-4 hours of work.
3 Empirical Methodology

Difference-in-Difference
The phase wise implementation of NREGA across Indian districts creates a 'natural experiment' that is unique for a large program such as NREGA.
14 We exploit this phase wise expansion to implement our difference-in-difference strategy. As discussed in previous sec- Given that the criterion on which districts were selected in different phases are not in the public domain (except the notion of 'backward districts'), the DID has its advantage as it does not require us to specify the rules by which the treatment is assigned. In addition, the treatment and comparison groups do not necessarily need to have the same pre intervention conditions (World Bank, 2011, p99). 15 To apply DID, all that is necessary is to measure outcomes in the group that receives the program (the treatment group) and the group that does not (the comparison group) both before and after the program. 16 We use the following model to identify the impact of NREGA
The dependent variable Y idt represents outcome of interest for individual i in district 
Falsification Test
One key assumption of DID estimation is that the trends in outcomes of interest would have been same in both the groups (NREGA and non-NREGA districts) in the absence of NREGA, and implementation of NREGA induced a deviation from the common trend.
Although, the districts with operational NREGA and without operational NREGA can differ, this difference is meant to be captured by district fixed effects. 21 Unfortunately, there is no way for us to prove that the differences between the treatment (NREGA dis- an additional difference-in-differences estimation using a "fake" treatment. We use data from 1999-00 and 2004-05 to estimate difference-in-difference using the same treatment and comparison group districts. The only exception is that there was no NREGA in both the periods in all the districts. Thus we estimate the following:
The binary variable D04 t takes a value 1 for year 2004-05 and 0 for year 1999-00. W dt 20 One could potentially recover TOT from ITT under the assumption that operationalization of NREGA in a district does not have affected the non-participants' outcomes in the NREGA districts. However, we believe that this assumption is not valid in our case as operationalization of NREGA in a district probably will have an effect on the outcomes of non-participants residing in the treatment district. For example, there may be an upward pressure on the wages of non-participants daily wage workers because of the increased demand for daily wage workers after operationalization of NREGA. 21 One of the criticism of DID is that although DID captures the time invariant factors well, it fail to take account of time varying factors. However, we believe that we believe that controlling for individual characteristics take account of most of the time varying factors.
is equal to the interaction of the treatment group and year indicator, i.e.
If the outcomes were moving in tandem, then we should expect the 'fake DID (i.e. τ DID )'
estimates to be not different from zero.
Allowing for differential effects of NREGA
As 2007-08 was the second year of NREGA in Phase I districts, while it was the first year of NREGA in the Phase II districts, we use Phase I and Phase II districts as two separate treatment groups to capture the differential effects of NREGA on these two groups. The control group remains the Phase III districts, where there was no NREGA in 2007-08.
We use the following model to identify differential impacts of NREGA on Phase I and Phase II districts:
where P hase1 takes a value 1 if the districts were covered in the Phase I (2006-07) and 0 otherwise. Similarly, P hase2 takes a value 1 if the districts were covered in the Phase II (2007-08) and 0 otherwise. Our interest parameters τ DID1 and τ DID2 capture the impact of NREGA in Phase I and Phase II districts, respectively. We also test for the equality of NREGA's impacts across Phase I and Phase II districts, i.e. τ DID1 = τ DID2 .
Results
Our first and second sets of results present the impact of NREGA on employment in public works programs and labor force participation, respectively. The third set of results presents impact of NREGA on real wages of casual workers. 13 
Employment in public works
Did NREGA increase participation in public works? Ex-ante one would believe that as NREGA provide more public works opportunities, operationalization of NREGA will increase the participation of casual workers in public works. However, without comparing NREGA districts with non-NREGA districts, it is difficult to establish whether the increase in public works share is because of NREGA. For example, it is also possible that overall ongoing development in rural areas (for example, road construction to increase the accessibility of rural areas) might also increase the public works opportunities in districts which did not have operational NREGA in 2007-08. Given that the non-NREGA districts were better off to start with, it might be plausible that increase in the public work opportunities in these districts might not be less than the increase in public work opportunities in NREGA districts. Before proceeding to estimate the impacts of NREGA on other labor market outcomes, it is essential to establish that NREGA led to a significant increase in public works opportunities in the NREGA districts compared with non-NREGA districts.
Only 0.8 percent of the casual workers in NREGA districts reported working in public works in 2004-05, while this share was 0.6 percent in non-NREGA districts (Table 1) . 22 Table 2 reports the results of our DID estimates. Overall, there has been an increase in the probability of a casual worker to be engaged in public works across all districts between 2004-05 and 2007-08 (captured by the time effect). However, this increase in probability is much larger in NREGA districts compared with non-NREGA districts. Our DID estimates show that the probability of a casual worker being engaged in public works increased by 2.5 percentage points more in NREGA districts compared to non-NREGA districts. We find similar results for male, female, and SC/ST workers.
Panel I of
Importantly, there has been no significant increase in the probability of a female casual worker being engaged in public works between 2004-05 and 2007-08 in the non-NREGA districts. However, the probability of a female casual worker being engaged in the public works increased by 4 percentage points more in NREGA districts compared to the non-NREGA districts between 2004-05 and 2007-08. Hence, our DID estimates establish that NREGA has led to a significant increase in public works participation in NREGA districts.
Next, we check whether our DID estimates are confounded by differential pre-program trends between NREGA and non-NREGA districts. Panel II of Table 2 presents the results of the falsification exercise where we estimate a 'fake DID' using 1999-00 and 2004-05 data, when there was no program in both the periods. We do not find any evidence of differential pre-program trend in the probability of a casual labor participating in the public works.
Indeed, there was almost no increase in probability of participation by casual worker in public works between 1999-00 and 2004-05, and there was no difference in trends between NREGA and non-NREGA districts. The results of the falsification exercise increase our confidence in the DID estimates and we conclude that public works participation increased significantly in NREGA districts because of the NREGA program.
Labor force participation
The next question we answer is whether NREGA led to an increase in labor force participation? But before proceeding further, it is important to address why one should expect an impact on labor force participation decision because of NREGA. We expect an impact of NREGA on labor participation especially female labor participation because of following reasons. First, as NREGA is rights based program, people who were not in the labor force might be induced to get into labor force knowing that they will get work.
Second, there are many positive incentives inbuilt in NREGA for female workers. For example, the wages paid in NREGA works are equal across gender. The female workers are paid much less in non-public works than their male counterparts, and the statutory minimum wages (see appendix Table A1 ). A higher wage offered in NREGA works com-pared to prevailing wages adds additional incentive for female workers to work. Similarly, the Act stipulates that work be provided locally, within five kilometers of the residence.
This makes participation in NREGA work feasible for women as they continue to bear the main responsibility of household work (Khera and Nayak, 2009). Another incentive for women workers is that each NREGA work site has to ensure that proper childcare is provided. 23 Thus, ex-ante, we believe that the operationalization of NREGA should have a positive impact on the labor force participation decision, especially for women workers.
Khera and Nayak (2009) . 24 Without going further into the discussion on decline in labor force participation as it deserves a separate investigation, we conclude that positive impact of NREGA is felt as the decline in labor force participation in NREGA districts has been less than the decline in labor force participation in the non-NREGA districts.
If the long run trends in labor force participation differ between NREGA and non-NREGA districts, then we risk interpreting pre-existing differences in labor force participation as treatment effect (impact of NREGA). Hence, we performed the falsification exercise whose results are given in Panel II of Table 3 . We fail to reject the null of the 'fake DID' being zero for overall, male and female. This suggests that the labor force participation for overall, male and female were moving in tandem before the implementation of NREGA. For the SC/ST we reject that the 'fake DID' is zero. Hence, we cannot conclude convincingly for SC/ST as the DID estimate for SC/ST is also not significant.
Impact on wage rates of casual workers
It is well known that women's involvement in NREGA has been much larger than what was mandated by the Act. 25 There is no wage differential across gender in NREGA works. This is in contrast to non-public works in rural areas, where a large wage gap is observed across genders. Further, average wages received by female workers in NREGA are significantly higher than those received in other types of casual work. As discussed in the previous sections, female participation in public works increased. This will push up the average wages for female; however, there might be indirect effects also. For example, other types of casual work which pay much less to female workers may be forced to offer higher wages as a result of competition generated by NREGA. This suggests that because of NREGA one should see at least an increase in real wages for female casual workers and reduction in gender gap in wages.
The DID estimates (reported in Panel I of Table 4) suggest that for both male and 25 The Act mandates at least one-third female beneficiaries among the total NREGA beneficiaries.
female workers in rural areas, NREGA has made a difference in terms of increases in the wages of casual workers. Overall, casual workers in NREGA districts have experienced a 5 percent more increase in real wages compared to casual workers in non-NREGA districts:
the effect of NREGA is more pronounced for female workers compared to male workers (8.3 percent compared to 3.8 percent). Similarly, SC/ST casual workers also experienced a larger increase in wages in NREGA districts compared to SC/ST workers in non-NREGA districts.
We run the falsification exercise to check how much our DID results are confounded by difference in long term trends in real wages between NREGA and non-NREGA districts.
The results of falsification exercise are presented in Panel II of Table 4 . In the falsification exercise, we fail to reject that the 'fake DID' estimates are different from zero in the case of overall, male, and female wages. However, we find a significant pre program difference in trends between NREGA and non-NREGA districts in the case of SC/ST workers. This casts doubt over our DID estimates for SC/ST workers. Similarly, although the 'fake DID' estimate in falsification exercise for male workers is insignificant, it has a positive coefficient (0.031) which in turn suggest that our DID estimate for male workers (0.038)
is overestimating the effect of NREGA on male wages. What remains certain is that NREGA has a significant and positive impact on the female wages as it seems to be not confounded by the pre program differential trends in wages between NREGA and non-NREGA districts. Real wages of female casual workers increased about 8% more in NREGA districts compared to non-NREGA districts, and this increase in female real wages pushed up the overall average real wages in the NREGA districts more than the increase experienced in the non-NREGA districts. The real wages increased in non-NREGA districts also (captured by the time effect in Panel I of Table 3 ). Thus NREGA has been successful in raising the female wages more than the male wages and thus reducing the existing gender wage gap in casual works.
Differential effects of NREGA
Did duration of the program exposure matter? In 2007-08, Phase II districts were exposed to NREGA for the first year, while it was second year of the program in Phase I districts. Table 5 reports the results of the model (Equation 3 ) which allows NREGA impacts to differ across Phase I and Phase II districts. Part A of Table 5 reports the results for public works participation among casual workers. The DID estimates suggest the impacts of NREGA on the public works participation have been larger in the Phase II districts.
However, we could not reject the null of equal effect of NREGA in Phase I and Phase II districts based on F -test.
Part B of Table 5 presents the results for labor force participation. Here also, the DID estimates suggest NREGA's impacts have been larger in Phase II districts, however, we could not reject the null of equal impacts in Phase I and Phase II districts based on F -test. Part C of Table 5 presents the results of NREGA's impacts on wages. Again, we could not reject the null that the impacts have been similar in both phases. Thus the results of Table 5 show no robust evidence of differential effects of NREGA across Phase I and Phase II districts.
Conclusion
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) of India is the largest employ- We find a significant increase in public works participation as a result of NREGA.
We also find a positive impact of NREGA on labor force participation, especially female labor force participation. Post 2004-05, there has been a negative trend in labor force participation in rural India especially in the female labor force participation. NREGA has helped to mitigate the worsening situation and as a result, the decline in labor force participation in NREGA districts has been less than the decline observed in the non-NREGA districts. We also find that NREGA has a positive impact on the wages of female casual workers: wages of female casual workers increased by 8% more in NREGA districts compared to non-NREGA districts. In contrast, we find only marginal positive impact of NREGA on the wages of male casual workers. Thus NREGA has helped in reducing the gender differential in wages for casual works by pushing up the female wages.
NREGA has improved the situation of women workers by providing higher wages and more opportunities. This positive impact may well have longer term beneficial effects on social and economic dynamics in rural India.
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